ARE UNIONS DOOMED TO BEING A "NICHE MOVEMENT" IN A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY?
CYNTHIA L. ESTLUND

In response to Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist
Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (2007).

Professor Wachter has done something quite extraordinary in the
long-running scholarly debate over the causes of union decline: lie
has said something new. Wachter contends that the "corporatist"
regime inaugurated in the early New Deal served as the necessary
incubator for union growth in the 1930s and 1940s, and that
unionization has inexorably declined with the gradual dismantling of
the complementary institutions and the restraints on competition that
made up that corporatist regime. That is because unions' goal of
"taking wages out of competition," as well as union wage gains, fit with
a corporatist commitment to "fair" rather than "free" competition, but
are unsustainable in a free market in which cost-based competition is
inevitable.'
The novelty of Wachter's argument does not lie in linking union
decline and more competitive markets-including deregulation and
lower trade barriers. What is new here is the claim that union growth
in the 1930s and 1940s depended on a set of "corporatist" policies that
were briefly in place in the early New Deal.2 Wachter contends that
union growth needs explaining as much as union decline does, and
that both stem from the rapid rise and slow fall of "corporatism." He
traces unions' initial growth in the 1930s to a burst of organizing
during the short-lived National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which
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promoted unions as the necessary counterparts to trade associations
that were to establish "fair" wages and prices in key sectors.3 Union
gains were extended by quasi-corporatist economic policies of World
War II and the Korean War; subsequent losses were slowed by the
sector-specific systems of industry regulation (in trucking, air
transportation, communications, and public utilities, for example)
that kept competition at bay. But unions declined steadily as vestiges
of corporatism gave way to policies of "free competition" beginning in
the 1970s.
With that one powerful claim, Wachter seeks not so much to
refute as to explain the role of employer resistance to unionization
and to labor law reform to which union allies have long pointed as
major culprits in union decline: "As long as unions raise labor costs in
competitive sectors of the economy, unionized firms will continue to
lose market share, managers in the nonunion sectors will continue to
strongly resist unionization, and labor law reforms that facilitate
unionization will remain unpopular." 4 The upshot is that unions, if
they seek a wage premium without "other offsetting economic
advantages," are doomed to become "a niche movement," one that is
confined to the public sector and to "sectors where individual firms or
industries take advantage of either uninformed or immobile workers
to enforce below competitive pay packages."'
One might question how such a short-lived romance with
corporatism-which Wachter acknowledges came to an end even
before the NIRA was struck down as unconstitutional in 1935-could
explain virtually the entire growth of the labor movement from 1933
through 1950. Wachter's answer is that most subsequent union
growth came under wartime labor and economic policies in World
War II and the Korean War that were quasi-corporatist in nature. As
for the very rapid growth that took place after the NIRA was struck
down and before World War II, Wachter puts much weight on the fact
that the unions that grew most, like the United Auto Workers (UAW),
were formed under the NIRA, and gained "impetus" from the NIRA
policies.
But when we consider what it took to achieve those
organizing gains-for example, the UAW's recognition by General
Crucial support was provided by an antitrust policy committed as much to small
producers as to competition, and by corporate governance doctrines that permitted
managers to sacrifice shareholder interests to broader public interests.
4 Wachter, supra note 1, at
627.
) Id. at 626, 633.
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Motors after the Flint sit-down strike in 1936-1937-we may wonder
whether Wachter is overstating the case for the causal role of the
NIRA scheme.
One might question, too, why it took so long for labor's share of
the labor force to decline even after the Korean War and that period's
quasi-corporatist regime. Wachter's answer to this puzzle is that "the
dismantling of the corporatist economy was itself a long, drawn-out
process, taking roughly half a century," and that the longer-lived
policies of industry-specific regulation within key infrastructural
industries perpetuated elements of corporatism (and protected
unions from wage competition) for several more decades.6
That leads me to two quibbles with terminology-one on each
end of Wachter's dichotomy. First, Wachter's characterization of
industry-specific regulation as "corporatist" is at least unconventional.
While industry regulation did reflect the corporatist commitment to
constraining competition in the public interest, it was a far cry from
the model of governance through group representation-industrial
and trade groups, occupational groups, unions-that was the signal
feature of European corporatism and of the NIRA. That quibble,
however, does not strike much of a blow to Wachter's basic thesis that
unions thrived only where and when government policies shielded
them and their counterpart employers from "free competition."
On the other side of the dichotomy, Wachter's characterization of
contemporary economic policy as one devoted to "free competition"
needs qualifying.
In particular, I do not take Wachter to be
challenging here the viability or desirability of minimum labor
standards, such as wage and hour laws and health and safety
standards, or of insurance-based protections such as unemployment
compensation, workers compensation, or Social Security. Those laws
do constrain competition, of course, but they do not manage
competition in the way that corporatist or industrial regulation
policies do. It is managed competition that Wachter denominates as
corporatist, and it is the decline of managed competition that he
portrays as driving union decline.
With these qualifications, I find Wachter's thesis quite powerful,
and, as one who believes unions are crucial institutions for workers
and the society as a whole, deeply unsettling. Before accepting the
argument, we would need closer empirical study, and in particular a
comparison of the experiences of other countries with a history of
Id. at 613.
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greater or lesser governmental management of competition in the
public interest. I will return below to the question of whether the
increasingly consistent U.S. commitment to "free competition" is
either inevitable or good policy. But first let us consider a few points
that go to the size of the "niche" to which unions are likely to be
confined in a competitive economy.
First, there is a layer of the U.S. labor market in which minimum
labor standards and mandated benefits (wage and hour laws,
unem)loyment compensation and workers compensation benefits,
Social Security, etc.) are routinely flouted, in part because of reliance
on undocumented workers who are afraid (even more than other
workers) to enforce their legal rights. These sectors persist not
because employers "take advantage of either uninformed or immobile
workers to enforce below competitive pay packages,"' but because of
overly "free competition" that is unconstrained by even ninimum
legal standards. If the government is committed to enforcing these
minimum standards-which would require more resources and better
regulatory models-unions can play an important role in
enforcement, and in improving wages, benefits, and working
conditions in this low-wage sector. That sector has not historically
been a stronghold of organized labor, but the Service Employees
International Union's successful campaigns among janitors and home
health care workers, for example, suggest that may be changing.
Second, unions can achieve sustainable wage and membership
gains in other competitive sectors by organizing all or nearly all of the
firms in markets that cater to necessarily local customers. Many
services must be performed where customers or users are located,
such as hospitality and entertainment, health care, construction and
maintenance of buildings and infrastructure, and domestic
transportation of goods and people.8 Firms in those locality-bound

7

8

I. at 633 (emphasis added).
These are also sectors in which global competition is not much of a threat, and

in which significant state or national improvements in labor standards are
sustainable-i.e., are unlikely to lead to the loss of those jobs. The parts of the
economy in which importing, outsourcing, and offshoring are not major factors add
up to much, perhaps most, of the private sector economy. See Daniel Gross, WY
"Oulsourcing" Maly Lose Its Power as a Scare Word, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at 5. A
smaller share of manufacturing may be insulated from global competition, for
example, by a high cost of transportation, as in the case of goods that are bulky (large
appliances, assembled vehicles) or time sensitive (tiendy apparel, perishable foods).
Some industries extract and process natural resources that are scarce enough to be
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sectors can potentially absorb higher labor costs, or pass them onto
customers, if local competitors have to do so as well.) And indeed, the
most dynamic unions are focusing their organizing efforts in those
sectors, as well as in the public sector, often with an eye toward cityThat is also the logic of local "living wage"
wide organizing"
campaigns, which can incidentally help underwrite union organizing
and wage gains at the low end of a local labor market."
Beyond those locality-bound sectors, Wachter acknowledges that
higher union wages may be sustainable if they come with productivity
(including quality) improvements. Wachter finds that several decades
of empirical studies have largely deflated the efficiency case for
unions: the evidence indicates that unions tend to have little positive
effect on productivity (and that any gains are more than offset by
increased labor costs).' But even if unionization itself does not bring
productivity enhancements, it may be possible for forward-looking
unions, in cooperation with managers who regard them as partners, to
find ways to improve productivity.
The prospects for such
cooperation are likely to be improved when unions secure "neutrality
agreements" that aim to create a less conflict-ridden path toward
unionization.
Outside of those sectors and strategies, unions face a steep uphill
battle in securing sustainable wage gains. Unions might still pursue

worth extracting domestically (oil and gas, lumber, coal).
Some caveats are in order. First, some components of these products or services
may prove to be separable and transportable (e.g., modular construction). Second,
maintaining high union density may require barriers or costs to entiy-as in the case
of lixury hotels, hospitals, or the like. Third, if higher labor costs reduce profits and
thus returns to owners/shareholders (even if they do not reduce market share),
owners may shift their capital elsewhere. For, even if production cannot move
overseas, capital can, sometimes with a few keystrokes. The globalization of capital
markets puts even locally rooted producers into competition for capital with producers
in other markets who can extract greater profits.
10For example, the SEIU's campaigns to organize janitors in Los Angeles,
Washington, D.C., and Houston, and UNITE-HERE's campaign to organize the Las
Vegas casinos.
1 While economists conventionally predict job losses as a result of locally higher
minimum wages, empirical studies have found little or no disemployment effect. See,
e.g., David Neumark & Scott Adams, Detecting k//lcts uJ Living Wage Laws, 42 INDUS. REL.
531, 559 (2003) (finding small but statistically insignificant decreases in employment
associated with living wage laws).
12 Wachter, supra note 1, at 625 & n.190.
I take Wachter's assessment of the
evidence at face value for these purposes.
13For an argument to this effect, see James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and
Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005).
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other noneconomic goals. If they do so, they should meet less
employer resistance and less market pressure; however, they may also
meet less worker enthusiasm. Workers want union representation for
much more than higher wages, but they will want it less if higher
wages are not part of the package.
Still, the upshot of these observations is that unions' potential
"niche" in the private sector labor market is probably considerably
larger, not smaller, than their current share of about eight percent,
even if they continue to decline in the sectors in which they are most
exposed to nonlocal and even global competition. A labor movement
that is concentrated in the service sector rather than in auto, steel,
and heavy industry is likely to be a less wealthy labor movement. But
something like that happened in the 1930s with the shift from the
skilled trades to the mass production industries.
Thus far I have discussed the implications of Wachter's argument
for unions and their prospects for survival and growth. But what
about the implications for society and policymakers? A higher-wage
labor force can generate collective benefits for the community as a
whole: a stronger tax base and consumer economy, stronger families,
better mental health, less crime and social conflict, and so forth. A
decent society thus has good reason to promote higher labor
standards, as well as higher levels of unionization, than the market
would otherwise produce.1 4 Some gains could be achieved, at least in
the sectors and along the lines suggested above, simply by reducing
barriers to entry into unions: at a minimum, by combatting illegal
forms of employer resistance, but also by promoting less adversarial
procedures for resolving representation disputes, either through
neutrality agreements or labor law reform.
Wachter's argument implies that any large union gains would
require the renewal of economic policies that constrain market
competition, and he implies that he would be among those who
oppose such policies. However, years of corporate scandal, eyepopping executive pay packages, and growing economic inequality
might eventually persuade the large majority of voters who are

For a game-theoretic account of why societies-especially in developing
countries-gain from higher labor standards and yet may be induced to "defect" and
compete to amact low-wage jobs, see Alan Hyde, A Stag flunt Account and Deense (?f
1

7Tansnational Laboar Standards: A Preliminao Look at the Problem 7 (Cornell Law Sch.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-008, 2006), available at
http: //ssin.com /abstiact- 896362.
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ordinary workers to take another look at the idea of "fair
colnpetition."
National policies that promote significantly higher wages and
labor standards may ultimately require international coordination of
some kind, lest the whole nation "lose market share" in a more
competitive global economy. 15 In any event, societies, as well as
workers and their organizations, have good reason to pursue these
objectives in ways that take account of both intense competitive
pressures on firms and the multitude of ways in which firms might
respond to or escape those pressures, including importing,
outsourcing, and offshoring. The range of responses will vary from
sector to sector, firm to firm, locality to locality, and time to time.
That is one of the virtues of unionization as a strategy for improving
labor standards:
collective bargaining, with its underlying
architecture of contract, is well suited, at least in principle, to
accommodating the varied and changing needs and opportunities
that firms and workers face throughout the economy.
Finally, a word on the political side of corporatism: corporatism
in its fascist forn-that is, as a substitute for electoral denocracy-was
indelibly discredited in the inid-twentieth century. But much of
Europe, and the European Union itself, continues to be governed in
part through democratic forms of corporatism, in which individuals
are represented within government not only through elected officials
but also through organizations such as unions that represent them "as
workers" (or as shopkeepers or as manufacturers). Even as union
membership has declined (to levels that are typically well above those
in the United States), unions and the large union federations are still
regarded as legitimate political representatives of workers in their
respective sectors for purposes of negotiating wage levels and
participating in deliberations over other matters of social policy.
One need not advocate the wholesale adoption of European social
policy to recognize the potential virtue of multiple forms of political
representation,
including
representation
through
collective
institutions with the resources and expertise to investigate and
promote policies that advance collective interests. Corporatism in
that form is not necessarily tied to policies that constrain market
competition in the public interest (though it is easy to see why the two
might be linked historically). It may even have something to teach us
about intelligent self-governance in a complex market society that
1) See id. at 19.
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aspires to economic prosperity as well as liberty, equality, and justice
for all.

